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Abstract
We analyze the production process of Ph.Ds in economics in the Netherlands.
Our empirical results are consistent with the incentives that the actors in this
process face. Universities succeed in making students who are unlikely to gradu-
ate or will need a long time to graduate quit the program. We …nd that supervi-
sors who are active researchers have higher graduation and lower dropout rates.
However, this e¤ect is due to the fact that supervisors with a good research
record have better students. There is no evidence of an independent e¤ect of
having a supervisor who is an active researcher.
Keywords: Educational economics, productivity
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1 Introduction
This paper is a contribution to the small empirical literature on the Ph.D.
production process. As is common in that literature, we relate the input of
students to the output of graduates. This relationship is determined by the
attrition of students from the graduate program and the time that students
who stay in the program need to complete their doctoral thesis. Attrition and
completion are a¤ected by choices made by the students. However, the thesis
supervisor, the department, and even the university are also actors in the Ph.D.
production process. Breneman (1976) proposed a model for the decisions of the
actors, given their preferences and the restrictions that they face. We adapt his
model that was formulated for the US, to the conditions in a small European
country, c.q. the Netherlands.
Most of the empirical literature has focused on di¤erences in attrition and
completion rates between …elds and on the e¤ect of …nancial support on these
rates. Because we concentrate on a particular discipline, and all doctoral stu-
dents essentially have the same generous …nancial support, we consider other
factors. We show that in the Netherlands students who are supervised by active
researchers have a lower attrition rate and a higher completion rate. However,
this is not due to the quality of the supervision provided by active researchers,
but to the higher quality of the students that they attract and select. This re-
sult is consistent with the incentives (or the lack thereof) faced by supervisors.
Hence, our results are in line with those of Breneman (1976) who concludes that
the actors in the Ph.D. production process are sensitive to incentives.
Our study provides an interesting contrast to studies of Ph.D. programs in
Anglosaxon countries which are the only programs that have been the subject
of empirical research. We give a brief survey of that research. Bowen and
Rudenstine (1992) study graduate students in six …elds at ten major research
universities in the US over a 25-year period. They show that completion rates
depend on the type of …nancial support that the students receive. Booth and
Satchell (1995) analyze retrospective information, collected in 1986, on 500 stu-
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dents who entered (in 1980) a British Ph.D. program in the social sciences, arts
and languages, or science and engineering. They …nd that neither …nancial sup-
port from the research council, nor student quality, as measured by undergrad-
uate scores, have a signi…cant e¤ect on the completion rate. A variable that
does in‡uence thesis completion is the subject area, with arts and languages
having lower and science and engineering having higher completion rates than
the social sciences1. Ehrenberg and Mavros (1995) use data on entrants dur-
ing 1962-1986 in Cornell University’s doctoral programs in economics, English,
physics and mathematics. Following Breneman (1976) they consider the e¤ect
of labor market conditions on the attrition and completion rates. Ehrenberg
and Mavros …nd that completion rates decrease with time spent as a teaching
assistant. Dropout rates are lower, if, at the start of the program, a Ph.D.
student had a master’s degree or was not a US citizen or permanent resident.
Student quality and labor market conditions do not have a signi…cant e¤ect on
the completion and dropout rates. The authors note that this may be due to
the inadequacy of the student ability measures and the labor market indicators.
We use data on Ph.D. students in economics at three Dutch universities who
have a joint doctoral program. The data are obtained from administrative …les,
so that we only have a small number of student and supervisor characteristics.
Beside the substantial contributions to the understanding of the Ph.D. pro-
duction process, this paper makes two econometric contributions. First, we
show how to estimate the risk of an outcome, even if that outcome is never
observed. Second, we test for endogeneity of a regressor in a rather complex
competing risks model.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we discuss the Ph.D. program
in economics in the Netherlands and the incentives that students, supervisors
and departments face in this program. The data that we use in our analysis
are described in section 3. Section 4 discusses the statistical model and section
5 presents the estimation results. Section 6 discusses some implications of our
results.
1 Again this is consistent with the Breneman (1976) model.
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2 The Ph.D. production process
The graduate program in the Netherlands has undergone a major overhaul in
the late 1980s. Before the overhaul universities recruited junior faculty from
the ranks of the MA graduates. Undergraduate education in the Netherlands is
highly specialized, and at the time an undergraduate degree was about equiv-
alent to an MA degree in the US. In addition to teaching, the junior faculty
worked on their dissertation which they eventually did or did not complete.
The supervision of this dissertation research was rather loosely organized. Full
professors had an obligation to provide guidance, but the lack of a deadline did
not ensure a timely completion of the thesis. Non-completion was not a reason
for denial of tenure, although it precluded promotion to senior faculty positions.
In the 1980s higher education was restructured. First, the duration of (still
specialized) undergraduate programs was limited to 4 years. As a consequence,
the undergraduate degree was no longer a su¢cient preparation for independent
research. For that reason, a graduate program was established that in addition
to the opportunity of research under the supervision of a (full) professor, pro-
vided for additional education and training. In the new system, the Ph.D.
student or AIO (Assistent In Opleiding) has a four year contract. In these four
years he/she attends classes that are a preparation for independent research.
The education component of the program lasts about one year2. Unlike the US
there is no qualifying exam after this year. For the rest of the four years the AIO
works under supervision on a Ph.D. thesis. The topic of the thesis is provided
by the supervising professor. Indeed, the order is that a professor proposes a
project, and if he or she obtains funding, then the search for a student who will
work on this project starts.
The AIO receives a salary that increases during the contract. The salary in
the fourth year is about 10% below the starting salary of an assistant professor.
2 The three universities that provided the data, have a joint training program.
The organization of the education component di¤ers between …elds and univer-
sities.
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Although the AIO would make more if he or she found a non-research job, in
particular in the …rst year, the foregone income during the four year contract is
not very large3. The teaching load for an AIO is very small4. Equipment and
even travel expenses to visit conferences are paid for by the department. The
AIO is an employee with full bene…ts which include medical insurance.
A Ph.D. degree is required for academic jobs. Usually a new Ph.D. applies for
a post-doc position. If he or she does well, and remains interested in an academic
job, he or she may …nd a position as assistant or associate professor (depending
on experience and research output). The supervisor is usually important during
the …rst years of the academic career. Not all graduates are interested in or are
able to …nd an academic job. There is a strong demand for Ph.D. economists
in the government sector and in research institutes and consulting …rms. Of
the students that completed their thesis 55% found a …rst job in academia and
the rest found a job elsewhere. There is no unemployment among new Ph.Ds.
The non-academic jobs that are taken by new Ph.Ds usually have a research
component, and employers now require a doctoral degree for such jobs. Non-
academic employers value the research skills of the new Ph.Ds and not so much
the specialized knowledge on the topic of the thesis. Although we do not have
much information on the dropouts, we have the impression that they …nd jobs
that are similar to those found by students with only an undergraduate degree.
If the AIO does not complete the thesis in the four years of the contract,
then he or she is entitled to unemployment bene…ts for a maximum period of
18 months5 If the Ph.D. student does not succeed in defending his/her thesis
within four years, he/she has to …nish the thesis while being unemployed or
while working in a regular job. Most students do not submit their thesis during
3 We estimate that the AIO could make 30% more if he/she chose not to write
a doctoral thesis.
4 There is some variation, but in general it amounts to one course during the
four year contract.
5 This is true for the students considered in this paper. Recently, the students
only receive public assistance which is much less. The students have to search for
a job.
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the four years of the contract (see …gure 1).
In this study we restrict attention to three Dutch universities that have a
joint Ph.D. program in economics. Economics should be interpreted in a broad
sense, as econometrics, operations research, and business economics are also
covered by this program.
The allocation of AIOs over professors is done at the departmental level. If
a number of AIO positions is vacant, there is a competition between potential
supervisors who write research proposals. After an internal selection procedure
some potential supervisors receive permission to hire a graduate student for a
period of four years. The quality of the proposal and the track record of the
supervisor are important criteria, but an equal distribution over professors is
also considered desirable. Only in exceptional cases does any supervisor have
more than two AIOs. If the students of a supervisor drop out of the program,
the committee may decide not to allocate any AIOs to that professor. Some
additional AIO positions are …nanced by the Netherlands Science Foundation
(NWO). These positions are awarded in a national competition in which re-
searchers propose projects. The quality of the proposal and the research record
of the prospective supervisor are the main criteria in the selection of proposals
that will be funded. The funding is only for the Ph.D. student and does not
include direct support for the supervisor. Because AIOs have a regular job, the
recruitment of new graduate students follows roughly the same procedure as the
recruitment of new faculty. To attract candidates usually an advertisement is
placed in a national newspaper or magazine. Often candidates are suggested by
colleagues, or recent graduates of the recruiting university are approached. Can-
didates are screened by a committee and if they meet minimum requirements,
the supervisor chooses among the candidates. The supervisor both selects and
guides the student during the thesis research. The selection process of the ex-
ternally funded AIO is the same as that of a university funded Ph.D. student.
For each doctorate the university receives 150,000 guilders (about $ 60,000).
Part of that amount is given to the department where the doctorate is awarded6.
6 The fraction di¤ers between universities
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In most universities, none of it reaches the supervisor. The university is respon-
sible for the unemployment bene…ts that the student receives if he or she does
not submit a thesis in the contract period and he/she has not found a job (yet).
Salaries of professors are independent of the number of graduate students that
they supervise (or have supervised). There is no clear ranking between Dutch
economics departments and the potential of a salary increase by moving is lim-
ited by a payscale that applies to professors. The lack of a ranking means that
there are no more and less prestigious placements of new Ph.Ds.
It should be obvious that the incentives for professors to provide quality
supervision are not very large. If the student works on a project that has the
interest of the supervisor, the student may expect that the supervisor will be
involved. Given the lack of reward, the supervisor prefers that the student will
do the work on his/her own. Good students need less guidance and for that
reason the supervisor wants to select the best student for the project. Good
students have an incentive to apply for a position with a well-known professor
who can help in the early stages of the career. As we shall see the selection of
students and the amount of supervision are consistent with these incentives.
It is interesting to compare the incentives in the US and Dutch Ph.D. pro-
grams. Breneman (1976) notes that in the US the structure of the labor market
has a strong e¤ect on the completion rates. In disciplines with a strong demand
for Ph.Ds outside the academic sector, students have no incentive to delay the
submission of their thesis. In disciplines where many candidates compete for
few academic positions and there is no demand outside academia, the relative
quality of the thesis is very important and students may want to work on it
for a longer period. Moreover, in disciplines with a strong demand salaries will
be higher, and so are the costs of being in the program. Because we have data
on just one …eld, we can not use the di¤erences between disciplines to investi-
gate the relevance of this e¤ect in the Netherlands. As noted, the demand for
Ph.D. economists was strong in the period covered by our data, and the labor
market conditions do not provide an incentive to delay the submission of the
thesis. Because the compensation of AIOs increases over the contract period,
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the cost of being in the program decreases. Hence, we expect that projects that
are …nished on time will lead to graduation in the …fth year after entrance7.
Because students can complete their thesis while receiving UI bene…ts8 for up
to 1.5 years or in their spare time while working, there is a strong incentive to
graduate within 6 years.
In the US professors derive prestige from the placement of their graduate
students at highly ranked universities. Moreover, the return to prestige is high,
both for the individual professor and for the department that may be able to
secure additional resources from the university administration. In the Dutch
system in which there is no clear ranking of departments and in which the re-
turn to prestige is much lower, placement of graduate students is less important.
Hence supervisors have no incentive to set high standards that will force out
students who cannot be placed in a high ranking department. Note also that
contrary to the US the university and department are rewarded for the output of
Ph.Ds and not on the basis of the number of students in the program. Moreover,
the enrollment is …xed and departments cannot expand their graduate program
to attract additional resources. The individual incentives in the Dutch system
should minimize the attrition from the program. The department has an incen-
tive to force out students who will not be able to meet the minimum standards
for a thesis or will require UI bene…ts to do so. Dropouts do essentially quit
from the program and this may happen at any time. Hence we do not expect
variation in the attrition rate during the time in the program.
3 Data
From the administrative …les of three Dutch universities we derived information
concerning characteristics of the Ph.D. students and their supervisors. In our
7 Due to administrative delays, the graduation date is about 6 months after
the date of submission. Approval is obtained within 6 weeks after the date of
submission.
8 The bene…ts are about the same as the salary received in the third year.
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analysis we use information on 250 Ph.D. students who started before January
1, 1993. The closing date of our administrative …les is January 1, 1998. After
removing Ph.D. students who had a foreign9 undergraduate education or for
whom not all relevant information could be extracted from the …les, we have
a sample of 200 Ph.D. students, who all have been exposed to the ’risks’ of
completion or dropout for more than 5 years.
Figure 1 presents the cumulative completion and dropout probabilities in the
program as a function of time in the program10. No Ph.D. student defends his
or her thesis within three years, while a few students graduate in three to four
years. Most students …nish in …ve to seven years after the start, and after seven
years the fraction remains almost constant, i.e. there are few graduations after
seven years. Figure 1 also shows that already after a few months some Ph.D.
students drop out. The attrition continues until the fourth year, and after that
all students seem to stay on. This is due to the fact that dropout after the end
of the contract is not registered, and students have little incentive to report that
they will not …nish their thesis.
For each Ph.D. student in the sample the administrative …les contain infor-
mation on gender, time to undergraduate degree, undergraduate degree at the
university that employs the supervisor (or not), …eld of undergraduate degree,
supervisor is a research fellow (or not). Although all undergraduate programs
have a duration of four years, students may receive …nancial support up to 5.5
years. Because in The Netherlands it is possible to fail (even repeatedly), only
students that pass (most of the) exams on the …rst occasion succeed in ful…lling
the degree requirements in four years. Hence an indicator of the event that
the degree was obtained in less than …ve years is an indicator of the ability
and motivation of the student. If the undergraduate degree was granted by the
9 We excluded students with a foreign undergraduate degree, because foreign
(and Dutch) Ph.D. applicants are not subjected to a standardized entrance test as
in the US. Dutch undergraduate programs in a particular …eld are of comparable
quality. At the time this was a small fraction of the starting graduate students.
The number has grown substantially after 1998.
10 Note that the dropout probabilities are on the right axis and read top-down.
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same university that employs the supervisor, the supervisor may have inside
information on the quality of the student. Moreover, the student may have
started on the research project as an undergraduate. Both the better assess-
ment and a possible headstart can have a positive e¤ect on the thesis completion
rate. Although undergraduate programs in a particular …eld are comparable be-
tween universities, students with an undergraduate degree in econometrics or
mathematics are considered to be better prepared for the graduate program
in economics. Although we have no detailed information on the track record
of supervisors, we know whether they are a research fellow or not. Research
fellows are chosen on the basis of their track record. Periodically, a joint com-
mittee of the three universities collects a list of publications of the faculty. If the
quantity and quality of the publications meets a standard, the faculty member
becomes a research fellow. Being a research fellow is mainly a honorary distinc-
tion. Research fellows may be better supervisors, but as we noted, they may
also select/attract better students. Appendix A gives the de…nition of all the
variables.
For a …rst impression of the e¤ects of the explanatory variables we calculated
the probability of completion or dropout after 5 years, shown in Table 1. The
last column summarizes the composition of our sample. One in …ve students is
female, one in three has …nished the undergraduate study in less than 5 years,
one in three has a mathematics or econometrics undergraduate degree, one in
four has a degree from the university that employs their supervisor, two in …ve
have a supervisor who is a research fellow.
The bottom row shows that 43% of the students …nished their Ph.D. within 5
years, 20% dropped out and 37% had not completed their dissertation yet. The
columns of Table 1 show the 5 year completion, dropout, and censored fractions
for subgroups. Men, students who received their undergraduate degree in less
than …ve years, students with an econometrics/mathematics degree, students
who graduated from the supervisor’s university, and students who have a re-
search fellow as supervisor, have a higher completion probability. Note that the
apparent negative correlation between the completion and dropout probabilities
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is a statistical artifact. Only when we consider the underlying hazards, can we
study the relation between the completion and dropout processes.
Figure 2 gives the cumulative completion and dropout probabilities for the
subsamples of students who are supervised by a research fellow or not. After 6
years the cumulative completion probability for students with a research fellow
as supervisor is 81%, while it is 43% for the other students. After 9 years
the cumulative completion probabilities are 85% and 50%, respectively. The
di¤erence in dropout probability is also substantial. After two years the students
with a research fellow as supervisor have a dropout probability of 1%, while this
is 14% for the other students. After four years the probabilities are 3% and
22%.
In Table 2 we contrast the characteristics of students who are and who are
not supervised by a research fellow. The main di¤erences are that research
fellows prefer students who have a quantitative background and that they are
more successful in attracting external (NWO) funding. In the sequel we will use
the latter distinction to test whether supervision by a research fellow speeds up
completion and prevents dropout.
4 Statistical model
Our statistical model is similar to the competing risks model used by Ehren-
berg and Mavros (1995). We assume that a Ph.D.-student faces two ’risks’:
one of completing the Ph.D., the other of dropping out. We investigate sev-
eral alternative speci…cations. We start with a competing risks model in which,
conditionally on the observed regressors, both transition rates are independent.
Next, we allow for dependence between the risks by introducing unobserved
di¤erences between the students. We consider only the simplest form of unob-
served heterogeneity that allows us to check whether there is a negative relation
between the unobservables in the dropout and completion rates.
The completion rate at elapsed duration t conditional on observed charac-
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teristics x11 , µc (tjx) has a proportional hazard speci…cation:
µc (tjx) = exp(vc + x0¯c + I 0ct°c) (1)
where ¯c is a vector of regression coe¢cients. The coe¢cient vc is a constant
term. Duration dependence is speci…ed as a step function: Ict is a vector of in-
dicator variables for the duration intervals that take value 1 on speci…ed annual
duration intervals and value 0 otherwise, and °c is a corresponding vector of
coe¢cients. These coe¢cients give the relative change in the hazard in compar-
ison to a reference interval (the interval 3-4 years). The last duration interval
is the open interval 6+ years. Since there is no completion in the …rst three
years, we set °c1 = °c2 = °c3 = ¡1, so that the completion hazard is 0 during
the period 0 ¡ 3 years. Note that these would also be the Maximum Likelihood
Estimates (MLE) of these parameters.
The dropout rate at elapsed duration t conditional on observed characteris-
tics x, µd (tjx) also has a proportional hazard speci…cation:
µd (tjx) = exp(vd + x0¯d + I 0dt°d) (2)
where ¯d is a vector of regression coe¢cients and vd is a constant term.
Again, duration dependence is speci…ed as a step function: Idt is a vector of
indicator variables for the duration intervals. We assume that the hazard rate
is constant during the period 0 ¡ 4 years, and again, be it at a di¤erent level,
after 4 years.
The observations can be divided into three groups (remember that all stu-
dents are followed for at least …ve years): dropouts during [0; 3) (in that interval
11 In addition to the variables presented in the Appendix we also use two uni-
versity dummy variables to account for possible di¤erences between the three
universities. We are not allowed to report the coe¢cients of these two dummy
variables.
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the completion hazard is 0), dropouts or completions in [3; 4) (both outcomes
are possible), and completions and right-censored observations during [4; 1).
After four years dropout is not registered. By censoring all observations af-
ter 4 years, we conclude that the regression coe¢cients in the completion and
dropout hazard and also the baseline hazard for both intensities during these
years are identi…ed. The identi…cation of the baseline hazards for the comple-
tion and dropout rates after 4 years is more problematic, because we do not
observe dropouts. The baseline hazard of the graduation intensity is identi…ed,
if we assume that the baseline hazard of dropout is constant after 4 years12 , at
a level that may be di¤erent from that during [0; 4).
To allow for (conditional) dependence of the completion and dropout rates,
we introduce unobserved di¤erences between the students. In particular, we
want to allow for the fact that students who have a low completion rate (for
reasons not known to us), have a high dropout rate, and the other way around.
The simplest speci…cation that allows for this, distinguishes between two types
of students with constants in the dropout and completion rates equal to vd1; vc1
and vd2; vc2 and with the fraction of type 1 students equal to p. E¢cient dropout,
as de…ned above, corresponds to (without loss of generality we assume vd1 > vd2)
vc1 < vc2. The identi…cation of the parameters is as before.
The parameters are estimated by maximum likelihood. The likelihood func-
tions are given in Appendix B.
5 Estimation results
The estimation results are given in table 3. The …rst column shows the results
for the competing risks model without unobserved heterogeneity. Students who
have a degree from their supervisor’s university have a signi…cantly higher grad-
uation rate. The same is true for students who obtained their undergraduate
degree in less than …ve years. There is signi…cant duration dependence in the
completion rate with the rate being lowest in the fourth year, higher from 4 to 6
12 Proof available upon request
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years, and decreasing again after 6 years. In the dropout hazard the coe¢cient
of research fellow is signi…cantly di¤erent from zero at the 5% level. The e¤ect
is large. Students with a research fellow as supervisor have a dropout rate that
is only 12% of the dropout rate of the other students. Female students also have
a higher attrition rate (signi…cant at the 10% level).
Note that the coe¢cients that are signi…cantly di¤erent from 0 (10% level) in
either hazard, except the study duration indicator, have opposite signs. Hence,
students with characteristics that make them unlikely to …nish their thesis on
time leave the program.
The second column of table 3 shows the estimation results when we allow
for two types of students. These types are not observed, but inferred from the
data. While the di¤erence in the completion rates of both groups is small, their
dropout rates di¤er substantially. The group with the lower completion rate
has the higher dropout rate and the group with the higher completion rate has
a dropout rate that is not distinguishable from zero. Again the students who
belong to the type that takes a long time to graduate leave the program. There
are about as many lower and higher quality students. Note that all regression
coe¢cients are somewhat larger if we allow for unobserved di¤erences. In par-
ticular, the e¤ect of having a research fellow as supervisor is now signi…cant at
the 10% level in the graduation hazard.
In the third and fourth column we consider the question whether research
fellows are better at supervising Ph.D. students than non-fellows, or whether
they are better at attracting able students. In other words, we decompose the
large negative and highly signi…cant e¤ect of supervision by a research fellow on
the attrition hazard and the smaller positive and marginally signi…cant e¤ect
on the graduation hazard into a selection e¤ect and a supervision e¤ect. We use
two estimation methods to decompose the e¤ect: a test using an instrumental
variable and selection on unobservable type.
We already noted (see table 2) that research fellows are more successful in
obtaining external (NWO) funding for Ph.D. positions. The indicator of NWO
funding is a potential instrumental variable that a¤ects the probability that an
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AIO is supervised by a research fellow, but this indicator should have no direct
e¤ect on the completion or dropout rate. The …rst condition can be veri…ed by
estimating a linear probability model for the research fellow indicator on the
included explanatory variables in the model and the external funding indicator.
The regression coe¢cient of the latter indicator is 0.40 (with robust standard
error 0.13). The second condition can not be veri…ed from the data, but it is
likely to be satis…ed given the similar nature of the national and university com-
petition for projects and the fact that the selection of AIOs is independent of the
type of funding. It may be that the national competition favors researchers with
a strong track record, and one might suspect that the quality of the proposals in
the national competition is higher. If a better proposal increases the completion
and decreases the dropout rate, we would expect that the indicator of external
funding has signi…cantly positive and negative coe¢cients in the corresponding
hazards. Because the potentially biased coe¢cients in column 2 are positive and
negative, respectively, using the predicted value of the regression of the research
fellow indicator on the explanatory variables and the NWO funding indicator as
an instrumental variable would result in a positive and negative coe¢cient of the
instrument in the completion and dropout hazards. The results reported in the
third column of Table 3 show that the coe¢cient of the instrument is essentially
zero in the dropout hazard and even reverses sign (but remains insigni…cant) in
the graduation hazard. Hence, if NWO funded AIOs work on more promising
projects, than the only explanation is that supervision by a research fellow has
a negative e¤ect on the completion and a positive e¤ect on the dropout rate.
From this we conclude with con…dence that even if external funding is not a
perfect instrument, the conclusion that the research fellow e¤ects in column 2
of table 3 is a selection e¤ect does not change.
Note that we use the instrument only to test for a zero research fellow e¤ect.
This corresponds to an Intention to Treat (ITT) test. Estimation of a nonzero
e¤ect is complicated, because the IV estimator for competing risks models has
not been developed (Bijwaard and Ridder (2002) make a …rst attempt).
In the second estimation method, we concentrate on selection on unobserv-
16
able type. In particular, we assume that the fraction p of students with (due
to unobserved variables) a low dropout rate and a high completion rate dif-
fers between research fellows and non-fellows. Column 4 reports the estimates.
Research fellows only supervise low attrition/high graduation rate students,
whereas the fraction for non-research fellows is .56. Apparently, research fel-
lows are better in attracting this type of students. This con…rms the conclusion
that the research fellow e¤ect is a selection e¤ect. Note that the model in col-
umn 4 …ts even better than the model in column 2 (with the same number of
parameters).
To illustrate the di¤erences between the two types of graduate students and
to indicate the importance of selection, we use the estimates of column 4 of
Table 2 to compare the dropout and completion of the two types of students.
For a male Ph.D. student, with an undergraduate degree in economics that was
obtained in less than 5 years at the university of his supervisor, we calculate
cumulative completion and dropout rates in case this student is a low attri-
tion/high graduation rate type (type 1) and in case he is a high attrition/low
graduation rate type (type 2). The results are shown in Table 4. After four
years 25% of the type 1 students has graduated, while only 1% has dropped
out. After …ve years the cumulative completion rate is 81%, after six years 97%.
Columns three and four of Table 4 show the cumulative completion rates and
dropout rates in case the student with the same observable characteristics is
of type 2. Now, the completion rates are much lower and the dropout rate is
substantially higher. After four years 26% of the type 2 students has dropped
out, while only 3% has graduated. Even after eight years only 42% of the type
2 students has graduated. After 15 years 54% of the type 2 students has grad-




This paper presents an analysis of the production process of Ph.Ds in economics
at three universities in the Netherlands. We …nd that students who are likely to
take a long time to graduate, are also more likely to drop out. The university and
the department succeed in making these students quit the program. However,
this attrition occurs over the full four years of the contract and even after the end
of the contract. It would be preferable to introduce a more stringent evaluation
e.g. after one year. The current evaluation does not succeed in making the
students who will not graduate or who will take a long time to graduate, leave
the program.
Our estimates also show that students of supervisors who have been certi…ed
as active researchers graduate faster and have a higher probability of staying in
the program. However, this is a pure selection e¤ect because active researchers
attract better students. Hence, the hypothesis that better researchers are also
superior supervisors is rejected in our data. Again this is consistent with incen-
tives that supervisors face: they do not derive much prestige from the placement
of their students and even if they need less e¤ort to give good supervision, they
do not make this e¤ort due to the lack of a reward. Because any supervisor has
no more than two students at any time, the result can not be due to the fact
that certi…ed researchers have more students.
The quality of the supervision has been a major concern in the discussion
of the Dutch Ph.D. system. Rick van der Ploeg who is a deputy minister and a
former professor of economics, has argued that there is no incentive to provide
quality supervision in the current system and that the quality of the dissertations
is lower because of this (Van der Ploeg (1996)). He blames this on the assignment
of students to professors at the start of the program. The students are captives
of their supervisors. To improve the quality of the supervision he proposes that
students who qualify for the Ph.D. program, select their supervisor. In this
system supervisors who are perceived to provide low quality guidance, will not
attract graduate students. Our results show that good students already chose
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supervisors with a better research record. These supervisors do not provide
better supervision. However, they may be helpful in the initial stages of the
graduate’s career.
If the supply of Ph.D. candidates is not a¤ected by the freedom of choice,
and supervisors can refuse to supervise more students than they do in the old
system, then nothing will change if the students chose their supervisor. The
problem is more with the reward structure: supervisors do not bene…t from
high quality research by graduate students, except if these students perform
part of the research agenda of their supervisor. To create a reward for the
supervisor, the university could transfer a part of the $ 60,000 that it receives
for each graduate to the supervisor, for instance as a research budget. The
payment could be related to the quality of the thesis by making it dependent
on the number and quality of publications derived from the thesis. This system
will be biased towards the better researchers who attract the better students,
but that can only be avoided by setting the standard for payment at a higher
level for these supervisors.
Although our conclusions are speci…c to graduate education in the Nether-
lands, the results are relevant in much of continental Europe that has a similar
Ph.D. program. The methodology is relevant in all countries, and in particu-
lar, our method to distinguish between the e¤ect of structural features of the
programs and the e¤ect of selection into these programs.
Acknowledgment: We thank the associate editor for excellent suggestions that
helped us to focus the paper
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Appendix A: De…nition of variables
Female: dummy variable with value 1 if the Ph.D. student is female and 0 if
male.
Study < 5 years: dummy variable with value 1 if the undergraduate study took
less than 5 years and 0 otherwise.
Home degree: dummy variable with value of 1 if the Ph.D. student has an
undergraduate degree of the university of the supervisor and 0 otherwise.
Research fellow: dummy variable with value 1 if the Ph.D. student has a research
fellow as supervisor and value 0 otherwise.
Econometrics: dummy variable with value 1 if the Ph.D. student has an under-
graduate degree in econometrics or mathematics and 0 otherwise.
Duration until completion: period of time (in years) between entry in the Ph.D.
and the date of the thesis defense.
Duration until dropout: period of time (in years) between entry in the Ph.D.
program and the date that the Ph.D. student quitted the program.
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Appendix B: Likelihood functions
The observations can be divided into three groups: dropouts during [0; 3),
N1 observations, dropouts or completions in [3; 4), N2 observations, and com-
pletions and right-censored observations during [4; 1), N3 observations.
The contributions to the loglikelihood of the observations in the …rst two
groups are easily determined. In the third group we only observe completions.
If a student drops out after 4 years, it will appear as if he or she is still in
the program at the end of the observation period. Hence, the censored obser-
vations comprise of students who are still working on their thesis, at the time
of censoring and of students who have dropped out after 4 years in the pro-
gram, but before the time of censoring. These are non-overlapping groups, and
the likelihood contribution is the sum of the probabilities of the corresponding
events.
If d = 1 if the outcome is completion and d = 0 if it is dropout, and c = 0 if












































The loglikelihood with unobserved heterogeneity is (we denote integrals of
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Figure 1 Cumulative completion and dropout probabilities
Figure 2 Cumulative completion and dropout probabilities; research
fellows and non-research fellows
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Table 1 Fraction graduate, dropout and censored after 5 years and in
sample (% of subgroup)
After 5 years Sample
Variable Grad. Out Cens. Grad. Out Cens. Total
Female 31 31 38 52 32 16 22
Male 47 17 36 69 18 13 78
Study < 5 years 54 20 26 66 20 14 33
Study ¸ 5 years 38 20 42 65 21 13 67
Econometrics 56 13 32 76 13 11 32
Other …eld 37 23 39 61 25 15 68
Home degree 50 18 32 69 19 12 59
Other university 33 23 44 60 24 16 41
Research fellow 53 5 42 88 5 6 39
Not fellow 37 30 34 51 31 18 61
Total 43 20 37 66 21 14 100
24
Table 2 Characteristics of students supervised by a research fellow
(%)
Research fellow Not fellow All
Female 21 23 22
Study < 5years 37 30 33
Econometrics 53 18 32
Home degree 58 60 59
External funding 13 3 7
25
Table 3 Maximum Likelihood Estimates (t-values)
Graduation hazard Obs. Unobs. ITT Unobs. +
Female -0.07 (0.2) -0.37 (1.0) -0.05 (0.2) -0.28 (0.8)
Study < 5 years 0.45 (2.0) 0.54 (1.9) 0.63 (2.4) 0.35 (1.5)
Econometrics 0.30 (1.3) 0.30 (1.0) 0.51 (2.3) 0.26 (1.0)
Home degree 0.45 (2.0) 0.62 (2.1) 0.44 (2.0) 0.51 (2.2)
Research fellow 0.30 (1.3) 0.58 (1.7) -1.08 (1.1) -
Duration dependence
4-5 years 1.57 (6.3) 1.73 (6.0) 1.58 (6.3) 1.60 (6.4)
5-6 years 2.05 (6.7) 2.40 (5.1) 2.10 (6.5) 2.13 (7.0)
6+ years 1.57 (2.7) 2.01 (2.9) 1.45 (2.4) 1.58 (2.8)
vc1 -2.61 (4.8) -3.46 (3.8) -2.19 (3.6) -4.06 (3.4)
vc2 -2.61 (4.8) -2.28 (3.7) -2.19 (3.6) -2.10 (3.7)
Dropout hazard
Female 0.58 (1.7) 0.96 (1.8) 0.42 (1.2) 0.90 (1.6)
Study < 5 years 0.54 (1.5) 0.62 (1.3) 0.58 (1.7) 0.65 (1.4)
Econometrics 0.00 (0.1) 0.13 (0.2) -0.56 (1.3) 0.17 (0.3)
Home degree -0.30 (0.9) -0.50 (1.2) -0.39 (1.2) -0.49 (1.1)
Research fellow -2.13 (3.6) -2.57 (3.6) -0.40 (0.2) -
Duration dependence
4+ years 0.73 (1.5) 0.72 (1.0) 0.52 (0.9) -0.04 (0.0)
vd1 -3.30 (5.7) -2.89 (3.6) -3.28 (3.6) -2.73 (3.4)
vd2 -3.30 (5.7) ¡1 -3.28 (3.6) -5.93 (4.8)
p - 0.53 (4.9) - -
p(non-fellow) - - - 0.44 (4.7)
p(fellow) - - - 0.00
¡ ln L 335.7 333.7 348.4 332.9
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Table 4 Cumulative graduation and dropout probabilities (%) by
typea)
High grad./low dropout Low grad./high dropout
Graduation Dropout Graduation Dropout
4 years 25 1 3 26
5 years 81 1 16 31
6 years 97 1 31 34
7 years 98 1 37 36
8 years 99 1 41 38
15 years 99 1 43 54
a) Male student with undergraduate degree in less than 5 years, degree in eco-
nomics from supervisor’s university.
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Figure 2 Cumulative Completion and dropout probabilities; 
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